Historians and anthropologists are confronted with a persistent problem for which there is no clear solution: the conceptual tools which we use to attempt to understand cultures are themselves products of (often) the very cultures we are attempting to understand. Take "religion". Daniel Boyarin (2004) 
has argued that the very concept of "religion" as we know it was a product of the fourth and fifth centuries, as bishops and emperors constructed Christianity as a religion (the true one, of course), and in counterdistinction constructed "Judaism" and "Hellenism" (or paganism) as "false" religions. For Boyarin, Judaism only becomes a "religion" when Christian authorities define it as one. The same could be said for the jumble of texts, beliefs and rituals that the English, upon arriving in India, lump together under the name "Hinduism", which they turn into a religion. Building, defining and policing borders between confessional groups has been an important part of constructing identities-or visions of community-in various societies

John Tolan
What is 'community'? The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen a salutary scepticism concerning the conceptual categories of the 19th century, whether they involve scientific (biological/genetic) attempts to divide humanity into 'races' or social-scientific categorizations into 'ethnicities' or 'tribes'. Such labels indeed need to be handled with caution, yet at times, in order to avoid their drawbacks, scholars substitute imprecise and unhelpful terms: 'group' and 'community' have both the merits and the pitfalls of their broadness and vagueness. As Andre Gingrich notes in these pages (concerning Yemen), 'substituting a very general, non-descriptive and formal term (community) for an indigenous term (qabila) and its partially problematic translation (tribe) is not a good solution, but is deeply problematic in itself.' The historian and the anthropologist are constantly confronted with the question of the appropriateness of their conceptual categories for understanding societies distant in space and time. Our own concepts (here, 'tribe') need to be defined (and their implications fleshed out) and compared with roughly equivalent terms in the society studied (here, qabila), always of course bearing in mind that these terms can have multiple meanings and may evolve over time. In the following pages, I would like to look at the evolution of two key concepts, 'law' and 'religion', and in particular at how law is used to define, identify, structure and enforce boundaries between religious groups. My time frame is the 5th to 12th centuries, a key formative period for the religious and legal systems of Christian and Islamic societies around the Mediterranean basin. I will in particular be looking at how law distinguishes between groups which it identifies as Jews, Christians and Muslims. Here again, historians like anthropologists are confronted by problems of terminology: to what extent is it useful to use our own categories (law, religion) on societies distant (in time, space) from our own? The danger lies in assuming that these categories apply to recognizable phenomena that one finds in all cultures.
We will need to pay close attention to terms used by the sources and how those terms evolve over time. The appropriate languages for our period and geographical area are numerous, and could potentially include Syriac, Greek, Hebrew, Coptic etc. To keep things (relatively) simple, I am going to focus on terms in Latin and in Arabic. In the lexical field of law, we will have to look at the meanings of Latin terms such as ius and lex, and Arabic terms such as sharī'a and fiqh. In addition we will be paying attention to terms used to describe texts concerning laws and their application and interpretation as well as terms designating those who practice law or implement or enforce law. For 'religion' we will be looking at Latin terms such as religio, superstitio, fides, cultus and the Arabic terms dīn and sharī'a. Over the eight centuries that concern us, moreover, the meanings of these terms evolve, in some cases changing radically depending on period, context and individual author. What's more, while 'religion' and 'law' are clearly separate categories in 21st-century English, in Medieval Latin and Arabic they overlapped in crucial ways.
I want to look at how these concepts shift and at how religious boundaries are defined and policed through legal texts during four watershed periods in legal history: 1. The emergence of 'religion' as a key element of personal law in the Christian Roman Empire (4th-6th centuries); 2. Religious identity and judicial pluralism in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (5th-7th centuries); 3. The expansion of Islam and the creation of a protected and subordinate dhimmī status; 4. The 'rediscovery' of Roman law and the refoundation of canon law (11th-12th centuries).
The emergence of 'religion' as a key element of personal law in the Christian Roman
Empire (4th-6th centuries)
Ancient Latin has two principal terms that may be translated in English as 'law': lex and ius.
Etymologically, it seems that both come from verbs that mean to bind or attach (jungere, ligere), suggesting the binding nature of law. But ius is much broader than lex. For Cicero, ius civile consists of lex, mos (custom) and equitas (fairness).
ii In other words the lex, as written and transmitted by Roman authorities, was only one of the sources of ius. As Alain Supiot has pointed out, while English has one term, law, to render both Latin notions, most European languages have distinct terms for ius (droit, derecho, diritto, Recht) and for lex (loi, ley, legge, Gesetz) . (Supiot, 2005: 27-29, 85-86; Magdelain, 1990 , Schiavone, 2005 ch. 1 & 4) A European jurist studies droit (or derecho, diritto, Recht) , to which he then will devote his career; knowledge concerning the laws (lois, leyes etc.) enacted by various governments are only one aspect of his study. This apparent linguistic accident corresponds to a difference of legal culture and legal practice. Anglo-American law is based more on common law notions and on legal precedent (with an accusatory legal system based on opposing parties of accusation and defence with a neutral judge and jury). Continental law is based more on the traditions of Roman law enshrined in written codes (with an inquisitorial legal system in which the judge takes an active role in the investigation of the allegations). Hence we see that even within 20th or 21st century European traditions, an Anglophone scholar may come up against unexpected cultural barriers when he tries to understand the place of 'law' in other cultures: these barriers are of course more imposing as one looks at cultures more distant in space and time, often raising the question of the legitimacy (or relevance) of the chosen categories.
What about religion? The Latin term religio comes from the same root as lex: ligere, to bind.
Service to the gods is also 'binding'. Religio refers both to an attitude of reverence, respect and fear of the gods and to the devotion shown towards them. The term is almost never used in the plural in classical Latin: religio is a general attitude and behaviour that can be adopted toward one or many gods. While each god/goddess has his/her own specific cult and rituals, in no sense do these amount to different 'religions'. Hence an ancient Roman would not understand the question 'what religion are you?'. (Bendlin, 1995) Religion in the ancient Mediterranean was often (though by no means always) associated with civic governance.
Thus for an Athenian, the festivals associated with Athena were civic, political and religious events of major importance: these different elements were inextricable. For Romans, the same is true for the cult of Vesta or Capitoline Jupiter-and, later, for the cult of the deified emperors. Refusal to participate would indicate lack of civic duty as well as religious duty.
Jews were early granted exemptions from taking part in traditional Roman cults, but these privileges were granted to Jews as a people or ethnos, not a 'religion'. The Romans had many accords with different nations (gentes or ethnoi), recognizing their rights to maintain traditional social, legal and at times cultic practices. Roman accords with the Jews were thus nothing exceptional, even if certain stipulations were unique to the Jews (not bringing imperial insignia into the city of Jerusalem, exempting Jews from participating in cults of Roman deities, not summoning them to court on the Sabbath, etc.). (Pucci Ben Zeev, 1995) The concept of religion as we know it is in many ways a product of the 4th and 5th century And while many cults (including that of the Jews) had priestly castes closely allied to political power, the structure of the new Christian church was meant to be more far-reaching and universal. It was of course one thing for emperor and bishops to agree to a creed and to their own authority over the emerging Christian Church, quite another to impose this idea on
Christians throughout the empire. Under Constantine the bishops emerged as new important players in the politics of the Empire, in many ways obtaining the privileges and influence formerly held by the senatorial class. (Drake, 2000) If in the 4th century Christianity became the first 'religion', it was to inspire imitators. Yet councils, patriarchs and emperors were never successful in imposing unity on the Church.
On the contrary, a plurality of churches emerged alongside the Church officially recognized by the emperors: churches of Arians, Miaphysites (also known as Monophysites), and other dissenters from Chalcedonian orthodoxy. These churches had their own legal-institutional hierarchies (with their own bishops and priests) and eventually their own distinct liturgical languages (Armenian, Coptic, Syriac, etc.).
To sum up, the Christian concept of 'religion' was born in the struggles with rival traditions.
Christianity comprised the first 'church' and first 'religion' and subsequently both Christian and non-Christian authors defined Hellenism and Judaism as rival 'religions'. This background knowledge is essential not only for historians of ancient and medieval Judaism and Christianity, but for all those (historians, anthropologists, sociologists and others) who work on 'religion'. Since the 5th century, 'religion' implies a unified doctrine or credo and often a hieratically organized church with a professional clergy. Our everyday concept of religion is inextricably wound up with the history of Christianity, which explains why it is often an awkward or inappropriate tool for understanding other societies: witness the frequent scholarly debates on whether Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism etc. are or are not 'religions'.
Religious identity and judicial pluralism in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (5th-7th centuries)
One of the pitfalls of much 19th-and 20th-century legal scholarship, as anthropologist Leopold Pospíšil noted in 1971, is to assume that any given society operates under one legal system, when in fact multiple systems of regulation and conflict resolution often coexist in the same society. (Pospisil, 1971: 99-106) Pospíšil attributes this common error to a Western prejudice based on Roman law, which claimed to emanate from a sole legitimate authority and to apply to the whole empire. But in fact the Roman Empire also knew considerable judicial pluralism. In theory, we can distinguish between legal pluralism (more than one law system having authority in the same territory) and multiple jurisdictions (more than one venue for judgement).
iii Legal pluralism was a constant in the Roman system, as Romans granted privileges to different gentes who incorporated the empire; such pluralism tended to diminish, at least in theory, with the widespread accordance of Roman citizenship. At the same time, in particular between the 4th and 7th centuries, jurisdictions multiply, as alternate venues for adjudication emerge and gain importance. In Christian Rome/Byzantium, access to the 'official' Roman justice system was costly and bureaucratic, and was usually an option in major criminal cases and in cases in which wealthy and powerful individuals felt they could benefit from the system. With reduced fees for the elite, and judges taken from the Roman elite, the system carried a clear social bias and many complained of corruption. Fees for getting a court hearing could be roughly the equivalent of costs of feeding someone for a year.
So naturally plaintiffs sought alternate venues for dispute resolution. These included episcopal courts (bishops wielded spiritual authority and from the time of Constantine were recognized as civil magistrates), the more or less informal courts of local lay magnates, and holy men (notably stylite monks). In many cases, both litigants would agree to submit to the arbitration of a lay or clerical arbitrator, thus avoiding the official state court system. (Simonsohn, 2011) Religious affiliation was an important factor in determining under whose authority any individual was, but it was a network of fluid and overlapping jurisdictions, in which individuals often had the opportunity to exercise choice (what legal scholars call 'forum shopping').
Religious affiliation was of course not the only factor determining legal status of an individual. This is particularly true in Latin Europe in the 5th to 8th centuries, as new kingdoms emerged in what had been the western empire, and as their kings issued (or had written) a series of law codes in which law and jurisdiction depended less on territorial limits of any kingdom and more on the legally or ethnically defined status of individuals as 'Romans', 'Goths', 'Franks' etc.. (Berman,1983: 49-68 ) Which law applied to any individual and how it applied depended not (or not only) in which territory one lived but on a variety of social factors: free or unfree, lay or cleric, Roman or Frank. In the Salic Law, for example, the wergild (compensation) for killing a man depends on the status of the victim: 100 shillings for killing a Roman; 200 for a free Frank, a 'Barbarian living under Salic Law' or a woman too old to bear children; 300 for a Roman who 'eats at the king's palace'; 600 for a young boy, a woman of child-bearing age, a count, or a man in the king's service; 700 for a pregnant woman. (Fischer Drew, 1991) Much ink has been spilt over how to interpret such laws. While often the kings who were at the origin of these codes claimed to be recording the ancestral laws of their gentes, we in fact were sometimes among the conditions of surrender applied to the defeated Christians. This is apparent in the Pact of 'Umar, which, according to Muslim tradition, the second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644), imposed on the Christians of Syria. In fact these restrictions were imposed gradually, throughout the first Muslim century, and expanded under 'Umar II (717-720). (Fattal, 1995: 60-69; Oulddali, 2012) The first author to give us a full version of the Pact of 'Umar is the Andalusian traditionist al-Turtūshī (d. 1126) in his Siraj al-mulūk. In that text, the Christians of Syria send a missive to Caliph 'Umar to remind him of the pledge they made at the time of their surrender. They present a long list of prohibitions that they agreed to respect: on building new churches and monasteries, teaching the Qur'ān, wearing 'Muslim' clothing or turbans, bearing arms, and so on. A numbers of these measures were aimed at limiting or proscribing the public expression of Christianity. Hence the Christians pledged not to put crosses on their churches, not to display their scriptures in public, not to participate in certain public processions, not to pray in a noisy or ostentatious manner, not to ring their bells too loudly. (Fattal,1995: 62) Tradition attributed that pact to 'Umar, general during the conquests and the second caliph, probably to grant authority to a status that took definite shape only slowly in the early Muslim centuries. It was during the 8th and 9th centuries CE that the Umayyad, then the Abbasid, caliphs and jurists defined and circumscribed the status of the dhimmī. By paying the jizya, the dhimmī-s marked their submission to Muslim authority and as a result enjoyed its protection. Land owners also paid the kharāj, a property tax higher than the one Muslims had to pay. Dhimmī men could not marry Muslim women, though Muslim men could marry Jewish or Christian women. The theoretical restrictions were not uniformly respected, however. Far from it: many churches and synagogues were built in Muslim countries; the clothing prohibitions were applied very unevenly, and a number of Christians and Jews occupied positions of authority in the entourage of princes. Yet in fact when one looks closely at the early legal texts or chronicles from both the Mashrek and the Maghreb, there is little evidence for a standard, uniform dhimmī system, but rather a wide variety of local adaptations, as recent scholarship has shown. Even for the jizya, often presented as the linchpin of this system, there are significant variations. The classic jizya model (to the extent one ever existed) was in fact a product of the Abbasids: in the Umayyad period, fiscal policy towards conquered Christians was quite varied and often based on practical considerations and respect for local traditions. The jizya could at times be imposed on individuals but also on groups; sometimes it was levied on lands (blurring the distinction between jizya and kharaj). A consequence of the reform movement was a redefinition of the political legitimacy of monarchy. Until the 11th century, kings and emperors were portrayed as the anointed of God, holy, crowned by Christ, His agents on earth who knew no equal; their consecration (through the anointment that accompanied coronation ceremonies) placed them not only above the laity but also the churchmen. Yet starting in the 11th century, ecclesiastical reformers increasingly challenged this ideology, affirming that the Pope was the true 'Vicar of Christ'. While kings and emperors never gave up entirely on the sacred nature of their power, they now sought other sources of legitimacy, in particular in law: putting less of an emphasis on sacral kingship, they embraced legal monarchy, for which they (or their jurists) turned to the legal traditions of Rome, in particular the compilations made under Justinian.
The renewal of Roman jurisprudence met the practical needs of a rapidly urbanizing society and bureaucracy. While it was supporters of the empire who first embraced Justinian's work, interest quickly exceeded the context of disputes between papacy and empire. Bolognese lawyers tried to order society along rational and universal standards. Justinian himself had tried to coordinate and unify the Roman law; he affirms that there is no contradiction in his legal works. xiii This assertion made sense to 12th-century readers: like the Bible, Roman law brooked no contradiction, and the work of a legist (like that of a theologian) is to find clever explanations to show that any conflict is apparent, that the laws of Justinian (like the biblical doctrines) can be (to paraphrase Abelard) 'diversa sed non adversa', 'different, but not adverse'.
In a way, these lawyers were performing the work that Justinian himself had ordered to be done: to accept his laws and to enact and explain them, so that they may better govern the empire. Indeed, as Harold Berman has emphasized, it is the 12th-and 13th-century commentators on these texts who first conceived them as a unified 'body' and called them the Corpus iuris civilis. (Benson, 1982: 363; Berman, 1983) 12th-century jurists tried to explain the Justinian code by referring only to other Roman legal texts, straining to impose order these disparate texts, or rather (they would say) to discover and restore the underlying order.
If the emperor is the supreme legislator, the source of law is not arbitrary authority: it is justice (aequitas), which the emperor puts into place and interprets, that is the source of law (ius); this justice (for many jurists) is identical to reason (ratio). Roman law is a rational order that should be restored. 'For a civil and religious society in which different customs prevail … the Corpus provides a uniform, rational law' (Winroth, 2002) At the turn of the 12th century, the papacy and its advocates had no systematic opus of canon law to oppose to the Justinian corpus. Canon law was based on a broad and diverse collection of texts: papal bulls, canons of Church councils, writings of the Church fathers, and biblical injunctions. Several 11th-and 12th-century canonists (notably Burchard of Worms and Ivo of Chartres) had compiled some of these materials into thematically oriented collections. But it was in Bologna in the 12th century that the most thorough and systematic attempt to forge a summum of canon law was undertaken: the Concordia discordantium canonum, better known as the Decretum. This work is traditionally attributed to Johannes Gratiani, or Gratian, about whom we know very little. Recent work, notably that of Anders Winroth, has shown that the Decretum was most probably a collaborative effort and that the text evolved over the course of several decades). In any case, the Decretum was an immense, thematically organized, encyclopaedic compilation of canon law that quickly became the manual of canon law, indispensable both for the church officials who applied canon law (and rendered judgments based on it) and for the masters who taught it, in Bologna and elsewhere.
This fundamental transformation of canon law has long been recognized as a watershed in how Europeans conceived 'religion'. For legal historian Rudolph Sohm, the 'old Catholic' church law (as seen in particular in the penitentials) was essentially spiritual and sacramental; only with Gratian did it become 'legal' in the modern sense. (Tolan, 2003; Berman, 1983: 201-3) Similarly, for Arnold Angenendt the scholastic revolution in both law and theology was key factor in the transformation of European Christendom from an 'archaic' religion in the Early Middle Ages (based on formulaic ritual and closely associated with magic) to a more modern conception of religion (based on individual spirituality and reasoned theological inquiry). (Angenendt, 1997) xiv While both Sohm's and Angenendt's analyses have been contested and nuanced, they are no doubt correct in seeing the intellectual and textual revolution of the scholastic age as introducing a fundamentally new conception of religion.
While the canon law of Gratian could be seen in some ways as a defensive response to the What about the Muslims (or 'Saracens', the term used by medieval authors, including jurists)? (Tolan, 2002) As gentes who had received neither the Mosaic revelation nor the Gospel, they were subject to natural law or lex gentium. Yet many Latin authors were aware that they had their own scriptures or law, often referred to as the 'law of the Saracens' (lex Sarracenorum) (Friedberg, 882) The Fourth Lateran Council imposed distinctive dress on both Jews and Saracens and prohibited both from holding public office or exercising any position of authority over Christians. These principles were consistently reiterated in subsequent law texts, both ecclesiastical and secular-though they were frequently ignored in practice.
The legal revolution in Europe between the 11th and 13th centuries thus saw the affirmation of a number of fundamental principles which were to permeate European legal discourse in the following centuries and which are still central to Western notions concerning 'law' and 'religion'-including, of course, the methodological suppositions of many historians and anthropologists. For legal scholars as for theologians in this period, God established a rational order to his creation, an order which man, through his God-given gift of reason (and in spite of his imperfection) can strive to understand. The harmony of the foundational texts and principles of law, like those of Christianity, were a matter of faith. This unified theory of ius as an expression of God's rational order of the universe evolved in a fragmented legal landscape, where diverse legal fora existed and competed (episcopal, seigniorial, papal, royal, municipal, rabbinical, ducal etc.) .
Like a tree whose growth rings testify to years of drought or flood, fire or cold, our 21st-century notions of 'religion' and 'law' bear the marks of the struggles in which they were born and in which they evolved. The four periods examined here are crucial to the evolution of both concepts. It was in the 4th-and 5th-century Christian Roman Empire, that the concept of 'religion' as we know it emerged, first to define Christianity, then to qualify the rival 'religions' of Hellenism and Judaism; and a key element in defining and delimiting these 'religions' is found in laws, notably those of the Theodosian Code. Yet we also saw that law was far from monolithic, and that in the late Roman Empire (and even more so in the kingdoms that succeeded the Empire in the west), judicial pluralism was the rule, as individuals and groups negotiated between competing jurisdictions. We examined Arabic concepts of din, sharī'a, fiqh etc., and saw how closely linked notions of law and religion were in early Muslim societies; we also saw how fiqh clearly defined the protected and subordinate status of Jews and Christians and granted them limited judicial autonomy.
Finally, we have seen how the 12th-century revolution in European legal studies fundamentally altered our notions of both law and religion.
Historians, anthropologists, sociologists and others should thus keep in mind that the terms 'law' and 'religion' are packed with strata of implications that have accumulated over the centuries: neither term translates easily into languages that were not shaped by these events.
Anthropologists have of course long been aware of this and have struggled to define 'religion' or to propose alternate terms. (cf. Morris, 2006: 1-13; Obadia, 2007) But often the alternate terms are even more problematic: 'faith' or 'belief' for example, emphasize a phenomenon that is at the heart of the definition of Christianity or Islam, but is only part of it-and is not the defining or most salient feature of other commonly-identified 'religions'. And of course faith and belief are important to many aspects of our lives that we do not recognize as pertaining to the realm of the religious. 'Cult', 'rite' and other terms pose similar problems.
The solution is perhaps not to find some euphemistic substitute for our loaded terms law and religion, but to bear in mind that these terms, like so many others we use, are far from universal, and that to understand them one has to comprehend how they have evolved over the centuries.
